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Remaking yeast: Metaphors as scientific tools in Saccharomyces cerevisiae 2.0 
Abstract 
Synthetic biology appears to be moving toward engineering whole living organisms. This article 
addresses how Saccharomyces cerevisiae 2.0, a whole-genome construction project, presents an 
argument for a route toward that end through discursive tools it employs to construct “synthetic 
yeast.” I analyze metaphors in recent peer-reviewed literature associated with the synthetic yeast 
project, asking how these metaphors shape the nature of synthetic yeast and relate the yeast to its 
parts and to its engineers. While chromosomes and other genome components are handled with 
metaphors emphasizing scientific control, the absence of these metaphors’ extension to the 
whole organism leaves space for the synthetic yeast itself to have unpredicted and surprising 
emergent characteristics. I argue that examining metaphors as instruments of scientific 
construction in disciplinary discourse, independent of their use in science communication to lay 
audiences, contributes to conversations about how and what scientists construct in their 
movements toward ‘engineering life.’ 
Keywords: synthetic biology, yeast, genomes, metaphors, discourse analysis 
Introduction 
Synthetic biology, as an umbrella for diverse approaches to “engineering biology” (Endy, 2005) 
calls for re-envisioning biological materials as engineerable substrates. As specific projects 
sitting under its umbrella, synthetic biology involves many diverse approaches for realizing that 
transformation. Synthetic biology has been ‘emerging’ as a field or collection of approaches for 
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at least two decades, during which its identity has been characterized as much by big promises to 
bring forth a bio-industrial revolution as by any particular approach to doing so (Frow, 2013; 
Molyneux-Hodgson and Meyer, 2009). Consequently, every new major effort in the field can be 
read as advocating for a particular vision of how engineering meets biology and arguing for one 
of many potential paths toward “making the living world engineerable” (National Academies 
2016).  
The Saccharomyces cerevisiae 2.0 (Sc2.0) project represents the largest undertaking to-
date in the whole-genome mode of synthetic biology, as defined in contrast to parts-based and 
protocell-construction approaches historically at the field's center (O’Malley, Powell, Davies, 
and Calvert, 2008). This “synthetic yeast project” aims to construct the world’s first synthetic 
eukaryotic genome assembled wholly out of laboratory-synthesized DNA. That genome takes an 
existing laboratory strain of the common yeast S. cerevisiae as a starting point for numerous 
large-scale modifications in an effort to make the resulting “Sc2.0” a more robust and flexible 
organism for future research and industry use (Richardson et al., 2017).  
In some respects, the Sc2.0 project is not especially new. Many tools employed in 
designing and constructing Sc2.0 are well-established in molecular biology. Geneticists, and 
people employed in fermentation industries before the advent of genetics, have a long history of 
custom-designing yeast strains. What makes the Sc2.0 project distinct is the unprecedented scope 
and scale of genetic work undertaken to create this new strain. Because of the sheer volume of 
DNA being assembled, the project involves new scientific, informatics, and organizational tools. 
In contrast to many other synthetic biology projects focused on constructing genetic pathways or 
circuits – engineering small components within living organisms – Sc2.0 is about constructing a 
complete genome and is therefore closer to the long-imagined goal of engineering in the context 
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of complete living organisms themselves (Palsson, 2000). This article aims to identify whether 
assembling synthetic yeast similarly involves new discursive tools – elements of the scientific 
toolkit just as real and just as influential as restriction enzymes or fluorescent markers.  
I examine metaphors in the peer-reviewed scientific literature of the Sc2.0 project as 
scientific tools involved in shaping what synthetic yeast becomes. The goals of doing so are two-
fold. First, I consider how metaphors used in scientific discourse function as information-
handling tools which participate in shaping what synthetic biologists develop. Second, I aim to 
understand how the Sc2.0 project, as a potential forerunner of a whole-genome approach in 
synthetic biology, advances an argument of how living organisms may be made engineerable. 
Consequently, this analysis can contribute to understanding how Sc2.0 is shaping synthetic 
biology as well as to how synthetic biologists are using discursive tools to shape Sc2.0. More 
broadly, this analysis connects the relatively impoverished literature empirically analyzing 
metaphor in disciplinary scientific discourse, to conversations about enacting reflexive, reflective 
scientific research.  
Examining scientific discourse enables seeing how synthetic biologists (re)shape living 
systems and bring about future worlds with discursive tools – tools used to make knowledge both 
in and outside the lab. These tools therefore enable cross-community conversations involving the 
kinds of questions de la Bellacasa (2011) asks in “translating ethico-political caring into our 
ways of thinking and representing things:” “How does respect for concerns in the things we re-
present encourage attention to the effects of our accounts on the composition of things?” Stating 
the case more strongly, after Mol's (2002) questions asking whether and how it is good for things 
to be made differently, we can ask: what are good metaphors for making life as we want it to be, 
and as we want to be in community with it?  
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Metaphors as scientific tools   
Metaphors are essential to scientific discourse. As has been observed by scholars as diverse as 
Stanley Falkow (“Ending the War,” 2006) in microbiology, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and 
Elena Semino (2008) in cognitive linguistics, and Evelyn Fox Keller (1995) and Donna Haraway 
(1976) in science studies, among many others, metaphors do not merely make science more 
accessible to popular audiences but are essential to getting science done.  
Kenneth Burke (1967) gives a classic formulation of how metaphors shape knowledge. 
For Burke, any set of discursive choices function as a “terministic screen,” forming a screen or 
lens that inevitably colors the observations language-users make: some things become more 
visible, others less so, such that the screen shapes observed reality. These mediations are 
inevitable insofar as “we must use terministic screens, since we can’t say anything without the 
use of terms; whatever terms we use, they necessarily constitute a corresponding kind of screen; 
and any such screen necessarily directs the attention to one field rather than another” (Burke, 
1967).  
Metaphors shape how language-users understand something (the target domain) by 
suggesting its similarity to something else (the source domain), instructing readers to apply a 
screen already developed in one context to pattern how a new picture takes shape. By suggesting 
that the preexisting screen and set of terms apply in the new situation, metaphors also locate new 
scientific work in the context of preexisting knowledge, instructing readers (per Stanley Fish’s 
terminology) in how to connect newly introduced information to what they already know. 
Metaphors which become standard ways of thinking and communicating about scientific 
phenomena thus lay out patterns that suggest what may be done with new information, what 
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additional questions are reasonable, and how new and existing concepts relate (Brown, 2003). 
Thomas Kuhn makes a similar argument in Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) in 
presenting how paradigms influence scientific observation. Independent of Kuhn’s conclusions 
about relationships amongst paradigms or how scientists move amongst them (robustly disputed 
in science studies, particularly in their applicability to biology; see, for example, Keller, 2012), 
his suggestion that the scope of any line of scientific inquiry is embedded in its initial choice of 
terms coheres with rhetorical scholarship about how language shapes thought. 
The consequences of such patterning are evident in Evelyn Fox Keller’s (1995) account 
of conflicts amongst developmental biology and genetics in the twentieth century, which traces 
how genetics has been shaped by “director” metaphors accepted early in its development to 
describe how nuclear DNA relates to the rest of the cell. Morganian genetics won wars for 
epistemic dominance, Keller suggests, at least in part because asking how genes produce effects 
as directors of cellular action was a much more readily answered set of questions than asking 
how “environmental signals alter what a gene does.” Consequently, molecular biology has 
largely worked to describe linear genetic effects, seeing contributions from the rest of the cell as 
secondary, with long-lasting influence on synthetic biology and other derivative fields.   
By suggesting appropriate images to apply in formulating questions and guiding what 
makes sense as knowledge in the search for a response, metaphors iteratively make their targets 
more and more like their own image and make seeing those targets through different screens 
increasingly difficult. Some of Foucault’s (1989) metaphors for this phenomenon involve 
knowledge sedimenting like layers of silt, becoming more and more difficult to unmake the 
deeper they become and the more they stick together. This is not to say that metaphors can force 
the world into any physical shape. As Keller (1995) puts it, their “efficacy” relies on the 
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“resources” afforded by the relevant social, natural, and technical environments. Terministic 
screens have effects in conjunction with some observable reality seen through them. Metaphors 
can be seen as information-handling tools which, like other tools, leave marks behind.  
In the synthetic yeast project, scientists employ metaphors not only to construct new 
knowledge about how yeast DNA works but to physically rebuild the yeast genome, remaking 
the physical resources of the genome in the image of the metaphors they use to conceptualize it. 
Understanding which metaphors scientists use with synthetic yeast and other genetic 
construction projects therefore becomes important to understanding how science is done and 
what science makes, what science can be done and what science is likely to make, in addition to 
understanding how explanations of that work are constructed for other audiences.  
In any attempt to generalize across studies of metaphor in science, it is important to 
observe that the vast majority of such studies continue to concern popular science 
communication and implications for public understanding of science (though important 
exceptions include Brown, 2003; Semino, 2008). As importantly, both for studies of popular 
communication and less frequent studies of disciplinary discourse, diverse theoretical 
positionings are at play. Brown (2003), for example, argues that metaphorical reasoning 
underpins most scientific work and that examining scientific rhetoric can unlock underlying 
principles of scientific thought. Many studies in the public understanding of science literature 
(e.g. Christidou, Dimopoulos, and Koulaidis, 2004; Gschmeidler & Seiringer, 2011; Hellsten & 
Nerlich 2011) examine metaphors as framing devices in popular science news without engaging 
with metaphor in scientific discourse at all. Freddi, Korte, and Schmied (2013), meanwhile, 
introduce “developments and trends in the rhetoric of science” by claiming that science needs 
rhetoric “in the basic sense as a means of expression in order to inform, persuade or motivate 
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particular audiences in specific situations,” placing science outside of and before the language 
used to communicate it. The present study belongs to a building line of critical STS approaches 
to science communication beginning from the position that rhetorical devices are necessarily 
constitutive of scientific knowledge as something able to travel beyond one worker at the 
laboratory bench, and which therefore focus attention on disciplinary discourse in addition to 
popular communication.  
Early in 2017, the Sc2.0 consortium celebrated a major milestone with the publication of 
seven new scientific articles about the project in a special issue of the journal Science, together 
with two brief commentary pieces – one from the issue's editors, one about the accompanying 
artwork. This special issue affords an ideal corpus for investigating questions about the discourse 
of synthetic yeast. I employ a metaphor analysis of the seven articles in the issue to ask: what 
metaphors shape Sc2.0? How do these metaphors advocate for how whole organisms are made 
engineerable? I contextualize this textual analysis through eighteen months of experience 
working alongside scientists, informaticians, and designers in an Sc2.0 consortium laboratory. 
Background: Saccharomyces cerevisiae 2.0  
Synthetic biology is a field or community resistant to singular definitions, but generally 
characterized by a focus on “the design and engineering of biologically based parts” (Synthetic 
Biology Roadmap for the UK, 2012). Most synthetic biology work can be described as taking 
one of three general approaches: trying to create standardized genetic parts which can be linked 
together to form customizable pathways (the parts-based approach), building simplified whole 
cells from non-living components (the protocell approach), or using existing organisms as 
starting points for redesigning and synthesizing whole genomes (the whole-genome approach) 
(O'Malley, Powell, Davies, and Calvert, 2008). Previous whole-genome work has been limited to 
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viruses and bacteria and largely undertaken by the J. Craig Venter Institute, a California-based 
private research institution best known for creating a bacterium with the smallest genome known 
to sustain a free-living cell (Hutchison et al., 2016).  
Sc2.0 is the first attempt to synthesize the whole genome of a eukaryotic organism. 
Eukaryotes, in comparison with prokaryotic bacteria and their single circular genomes, have 
substantially larger genomes organized into multiple chromosomes. The Sc2.0 project works at 
an order of magnitude larger than previous bacteria-based projects (approximately 12 megabases 
for S. cerevisiae versus approximately 1 megabase for Mycoplasma; Dymond and Boeke, 2012), 
and has likewise led to a larger and more complex project organization. Rather than being 
undertaken by a single research group, Sc2.0 construction involves a consortium of eleven 
laboratories located in the United States, the United Kingdom, China, Singapore, and Australia, 
in addition to several affiliates in continental Europe and the United States.  
The design principles of the synthetic yeast genome – fitness, genome stability, and 
genetic flexibility (Dymond et al., 2011) and the detailed DNA sequence – were centrally 
determined by the project’s leaders. Individual laboratories have taken responsibility for 
constructing one or more of the yeast genome's sixteen chromosomes and have been free to 
devise their own preferred means of doing so. Two laboratories are making additional 
contributions to the genome. At the University of Edinburgh, the Cai lab has constructed a 
seventeenth “neochromosome” to which all 275 recombination-prone tRNA genes have been 
relegated (Walker, 2017). These genes, considered “hotspots of instability” (ibid.) normally 
scattered across the yeast genome, are being quarantined to this separate DNA molecule in an 
attempt to make the finished synthetic genome more stable.  At the Australian Wine Research 
Institute, a small team is constructing what they call a “pan genome,” a non-essential add-on 
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module to the basic genome comprised of genes from yeast strains used in beer, bread, wine, and 
sake production that are not found in the laboratory yeast strain being used as the basis for Sc2.0. 
Adding this pan genome to the completed synthetic yeast will, they hope, transform the 
laboratory strain on which the Sc2.0 genome is based – a strain wholly unsuitable for food 
fermentation tasks – into a more functionally diverse organism with useful applications for wine 
and other fermentation industries.  
The Sc2.0 project is unique not only in terms of the magnitude of DNA being designed 
and constructed, but in how extensively the template yeast genome is being modified. Previous 
bacterial projects have either made relatively minor additions to existing genomes – adding 
‘trademark’ sequences or encoding small sections of English-language text – or have worked 
toward increasingly small genomes by deleting as many genes as possible, largely through trial 
and error, while still enabling cell survival. The Sc2.0 genome, in contrast, incorporates 
numerous systematic genome-wide modifications. In addition to relocating tRNA genes to the 
neochromosome, noncoding DNA is being deleted, making the whole genome about 8% shorter 
than the original. Stop codons,ii which normally occur in two forms (TAG and TAA), have all 
been changed to a single form, TAA, so that TAG can be 'freed up' to encode an additional 
unconventional amino acid later on. Most interestingly, the whole genome incorporates a system 
called SCRaMbLE that yeast biologists in and outside the project suggest may deliver the Sc2.0 
project’s most important contributions to that field (Dymond et al., 2011; Richardson et al., 
2017).  
SCRaMbLE is both a clever acronym and a metaphorical expression standing for 
Synthetic Chromosomal Rearrangement and Modification by LoxPsym-Mediated Evolution. In 
other words, SCRaMbLE is a system of short sequences distributed throughout the genome that 
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serve as recognition sites for an enzyme, Cre recombinase, able to catalyze rearrangement 
between any two of these sites. When a yeast strain bearing one or more synthetic chromosomes 
harbors the cre recombinase gene on a plasmid (a small, circular DNA molecule separate from 
the nuclear genome) under the control of a hormone-activated promoter, synthetic biologists can 
‘scramble’ the synthetic chromosomes on command by introducing the appropriate hormone 
signal into the yeast growth media. Recombinase recognition sites have been written into the 
synthetic genome at the end of all putatively non-essential genes and at important chromosomal 
features.iii Inducing expression of the recombinase enzyme, by catalyzing recombination 
amongst any of these sites, therefore creates the possibility of large-scale rearrangements 
including duplications, deletions, inversions, and translocations (Shen et al., 2015). While the 
technologies involved in SCRaMbLE are old, this mode of implementing them is new and has 
potentially broad ramifications for developing new yeast strains and learning about yeast gene 
function.  
Methods 
The corpus for this study comes from a special issue of Science featuring Sc2.0 published on 9 
March, 2017. While much has been written around the project’s periphery, this special issue 
contains more than half of extant research articles directly describing chromosome construction, 
including five articles about newly completed chromosomes, one about characterizing a 
previously completed chromosome, and one describing the global strategy for designing the 
genome (table 1). Importantly, the special issue represents several years of cross-consortium 
collaboration during which the full genome sequence was designed in silico and several full 
chromosomes synthesized in yeastoi (Lin, 2015) such that it is reasonable, at this stage, to expect 
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the working metaphors of the project to have achieved some degree of stability. The issue also 
represents the work of laboratory teams in the United States, Scotland, and China, enabling some 
sense of how metaphors characterize the project at an international consortium-level. Two 
commentaries accompany the research articles: one from the issue's editors about the importance 
of the project to the scientific community, and one from the artists responsible for the cover 
design and the illustration for the editorial commentary about creating those images. As my 
interest here is in the metaphors which enable scientists’ operations, I focus solely on the seven 
peer-reviewed research articles.  
My textual analysis is informed by a year of collaboration with the consortium and close 
contact with one of the consortium laboratories. For one or two days each week, I worked in the 
laboratory office alongside PhD students and postdocs, participating in conversations and 
meetings and being involved as an associate member of the lab group. I have also conducted 
formal interviews and had informal conversations with many members of the Sc2.0 consortium 
about, among other things, the nature of the “synthetic yeast” under construction. This discursive 
immersion provides context for reading the Science corpus from an insider-outsider position – a 
position Valve and McNally (2013) liken to someone who “engages with a project as if it were a 
client, and who therefore takes the project's objectives very seriously while at the same time 
retaining his or her own normativity” and disciplinary perspectives (474). I sought to read 
simultaneously with an insider's understanding of how language functions in the context of the 
wider project and an outsider's critical eye to what else that language might do.  
I read each of the seven research articles in full and in detail, focusing on the sentence 
level, and cataloguing all metaphors applied to DNA, chromosomes, the genome, the synthetic 
yeast, or other targets of the project's work. I ignored two categories of dead or conventional 
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metaphors which are not specially characteristic of the project. The first, metaphors conventional 
to general discourse, are common uses of expressions such as “this work paves the way” (Mercy 
et al., 2017). The second are metaphors conventional to specialized scientific discourses which 
contribute to Sc2.0 (e.g. genetics, genomics, microbiology), such as “wild type” to describe the 
phenotype of the unmodified parent organism or “cell debris” to describe the unfiltered results of 
mechanically breaking up cells in a liquid suspension. While these metaphors are interesting in 
their own right and indicate that synthetic biology draws working concepts from a long history of 
metaphors in genetics and yeast research, they are not informative in terms of what new 
conceptualizations the Sc2.0 project advances or how Sc2.0 sits in the special discourses of 
synthetic biology.  
In what follows, I employ Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) convention of indicating 
metaphors in upper case and individual metaphorical expressions in ordinary sentence case. In all 
quotes illustrating metaphorical expressions, the italics highlighting the metaphor are my own.  
Analysis  
The single most characteristic metaphor of the Sc2.0 project is the project name itself. 
Saccharomyces cerevisiae 2.0 can be understood as metaphorical in at least two senses. First, 
Sc2.0 draws on the metaphor GENOME IS A COMPUTER PROGRAM, envisioning the yeast 
genome as an operating system which can be upgraded from ‘version 1.0’ to ‘version 2.0.’ The 
project's central coordinator, Dr. Jef Boeke, draws on this metaphor in communicating with the 
popular press, describing Sc2.0 as “essentially swapping out the code, if you will, in a living 
yeast cell with a sort of 21st Century version of the operating system” (Stein, 2017). This 
metaphor underlies other metaphorical expressions characteristic of the project, as detailed 
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below. 
However, Sc2.0 can also be read as a metaphor in another sense which points toward a 
methodological problem and a theoretical question. Sc2.0 draws on the metaphor 
ENGINEERED YEAST IS SACCHAROMYCES CEREVISIAE. We could say that all species 
identifications are metaphorical in referring to some new organism in the same terms as a 
previously categorized organism, even though the two organisms are not ‘really’ the same thing. 
The species assignation patterns the target – the new organism – after the source – some already 
identified organism – making some features of the new organism more important and easy to see 
and others less important. Scientists, in treating the engineered yeast genome as Saccharomyces 
cerevisiae by naming it Saccharomyces cerevisiae 2.0, are indicating that the engineered genome 
and other S. cerevisiae genomes are the same thing in a particular organizational schema. 
Whether this and other species identifications are metaphorical requires drawing lines around the 
canonical meaning of S. cerevisiae and other species designations.  
Notwithstanding their inestimable value in defining the centrality of metaphors to 
language, a major problem with Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) theory of metaphor is that it 
requires identifying a primary or canonical meaning of any potentially metaphorical term. 
Identifying metaphors in contrast to non-metaphorical language requires drawing boundaries 
around canonical uses to separate them from metaphorical ones. And yet, these core or literal 
meanings are both fluid and elastic – changing over time – and discourse-specific. What 
functions as a metaphor in one discourse community may function both as a central meaning and 
a literal mode of operation in another (a point explored in more detail for scientific metaphors by 
Semino, 2008). Identifying metaphor within a discourse community, too, requires establishing 
some core or more literal meaning (e.g. Pragglejaz Group, 2007).  
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 The expression “genetic code” is a pertinent example. Genetic code has long since ceased 
to be a metaphor in at least three senses. One, the dominant understanding of genetics has been 
fashioned to make current accepted knowledge about DNA sequences fit the core definition of 
“code.” Two, “genetic” represents a primary meaning of the word “code” widely recognized in 
dictionaries; the Oxford English Dictionary online, for example, lists one meaning of the verb 
“code” as “to be the genetic determiner of,” dating the use from a 1962 paper in the Proceedings 
of the National Academy of Sciences. Three, scientists manipulate DNA sequences in ways 
congruent with other widespread applications of the word “code.” Similarly, while “gene 
editing” may still be treated as a metaphor in popular media, geneticists work with DNA in ways 
captured by the ‘ordinary’ or core meaning of “editing,” and “gene editing” as a standard 
expression in scientific discourse is largely not understood as a metaphor by scientists who use it. 
Scientists are, one could say quite literally, editing a genetic code which has been made both 
code and editable through the work of twentieth and twenty-first century genetics. Similarly, 
most of the metaphorical expressions used in these seven articles have become so naturalized to 
the work of genetics, genomics, and synthetic biology as to no longer be metaphors at all in those 
discourses, in that their primary meanings have grown to encompass the genetic use. In this 
respect, a more useful understanding of metaphor in this case might come from Nietzsche’s 
(1992) argument that all language is essentially metaphorical in that we never use words to 
describe something entirely new but always in terms of something already seen.  
 To avoid the technical question of whether any given expression is or is not a metaphor 
and focus on the conceptual reasons for examining these metaphors in the first place, I consider 
them here as schema for conceptualizing synthetic yeast rather than questioning whether 
scientists ‘really’ edit or map or capture chromosomes in a literal sense. The interesting 
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questions in this case have much less to do with drawing boundaries between literal and 
figurative usages than with how metaphors function as tools for constructing Sc2.0 through the 
interpretive schema they invoke. The following analysis is comprehensive; excepting 
conventional metaphors as already noted, all metaphorical expressions in the corpus are 
described in the following categories. Quoting every instance of a metaphorical expression 
would exceed space limits, so exemplars are cited for brevity.  
GENOME IS A COMPUTER PROGRAM   
“Bugs” and “debugging”  
The most common metaphor across the corpus, GENOME IS A COMPUTER PROGRAM, is 
common not only to synthetic biology but to earlier genomics discourse (Hellsten and Nerlich, 
2011; Nicholson, 2013). In analyzing international newspaper articles about synthetic biology 
published between 2007 and mid-2010, Hellsten and Nerlich (2011) observed journalists 
describing “codes, booting up, software, hardware, programming, executing and tagging,” 
extending the “codes and software” (383) language prevalent in the previous decade's 
discussions of the human genome project (Nerlich and Hellsten, 2009). In this corpus, the 
computer metaphor is extended even further via expressions involving “bugs” and “debugging.” 
Wu and coauthors’ (2017) article describing synX, featuring “bug mapping” in its title, 
defines “bugs” as “fitness-reducing sequence variants” (eaaf4706). “Debugging,” therefore, “is 
imperative for successfully building a fit strain encoding a synthetic genome” (ibid.). Thus 
defined, bugs and debugging are central to the Sc2.0 project because one of the three central 
principles guiding the synthetic genome design is to maintain wild-type fitness (Dymond et al., 
2011). Depicting an organism’s genome as its operating system, common in popular press 
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articles (Hellsten and Nerlich, 2011; Stelmach and Nerlich, 2015), also coheres with 
understanding the cell as oriented around a genome in direct control of its other, essentially 
mechanical parts (Keller, 1995). The computer program metaphor participates in recreating a 
version of genetic determinism that sees the genome as the director in charge of cellular 
operations, subordinating other parts of the cell to necessary but subsidiary positions. 
In 2011, Hellsten and Nerlich pointed out that the computer programming metaphor as it 
is employed in synthetic biology creates an additional level of hierarchy: beyond giving the 
operating system control over the cell, the metaphor gives the synthetic biologist control over the 
operating system. The synthetic biologist becomes the programmer, the person with the capacity 
and expertise to write and alter the program. The synthetic biologist as programmer of the cell, 
however, does not work in the same fashion as the programmer of the computer. Computer 
programmers write new code as well as editing existing programs. Even if most programs are 
now constructed via standard programming libraries and patchwriting – a variant of plagiarism 
which Rebecca Moore Howard (1995) identifies as borrowing heavily without copying exactly – 
the computer programmer can and sometimes does write wholly new lines of text using 
component ‘words’ or expressions according to the logic of the programming language. The 
synthetic biologist as ‘programmer,’ however, never constructs wholly new genetic sequences in 
a cognate fashion. While genes copied from pre-existing (‘natural’) organisms can be edited, and 
while whole genes can be combined together in new ways, biologists do not yet understand 
enough about how DNA carries information to subdivide genes into smaller functions, or even 
whether genes can be so subdivided. Synthetic biologists can edit but not use words to write 
completely new sentences, a form of making text which Porcar and Paretó (2012) and others call 
more akin to DNA “printing” or “copying” than to “writing.” The computer program metaphor 
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thus enables a mode of understanding which grants scientists a greater degree of scientific 
control over the genetic language than they exercise in physical practice.  
The computer programming metaphor's extension in Sc2.0 continues overextending that 
sense of scientists’ control over genetic systems. Debugging a computer program is a process of 
making changes to portions of code responsible for deviation from the desired performance of 
the program – of fixing errors defined in terms of the goals of the programmer. Correcting errors 
requires being able to recognize errors. Computer programmers recognize errors as not cohering 
with the grammar of the programming language, or at least not doing so with the desired effect. 
Debugging means rewriting code so that it does make the desired kind of sense.   
Scientists constructing Sc2.0 define “errors” in the redesigned synthetic yeast genome as 
genetic modifications which are correlated with slow yeast growth. The scientists are not, 
however, able to identify the modification responsible for “growth defects” (as instances of sub-
wild type growth are called) as deviations from accurate genetic language. Rather, scientists 
retrace their steps, examining strains incorporating smaller and smaller sections of synthetic 
DNA, until they identify the synthetic modification associated with slow growth. They then 
remove that change and revert to the original wild-type sequence. Debugging Sc2.0 is not a 
process of correcting a recognizable error by making another change, but of removing errors by 
undoing a change. The biologist-programmer has made an error in modifying a well-functioning 
program – the original yeast genome – and can only correct the error by undoing the 
modification.  
Bugs and debugging appear throughout five of the seven pieces in phrases such as “after 
correcting nonsynonymous mutations in MOB2, the synVI strain still had a noticeable growth 
defect or ‘bug’” (Mitchell et al., 2017) and “use of a competitive growth assay established that 
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the debugged synX strain exhibits high fitness” (Wu et al., 2017). Neither expression appears in 
the article describing the 3D organization of genomes containing synthetic chromosomes (Mercy 
et al. 2017), which is unsurprising given that this paper describes analyzing synthetic 
chromosomes constructed by other laboratories rather than construction itself.  
 More surprisingly, the authors describing the construction of synV do not use these terms 
even though they describe work congruent with what is called “debugging” elsewhere. Instead, 
these authors use the idea of building a “'perfect' designer chromosome V” to frame how they 
“corrected all mutations found—including duplications, substitutions, and indels” (Xie et al., 
eaaf4704). Working backward to perfectly match the synthetic chromosome sequence specified 
in silico appears, for this group, to have supplanted correcting mistakes to work forward toward 
a functional, fast-growing, “bug”-free version. The absence of the debugging metaphor 
highlights a difference in the orientation of this group in comparison to the other authors: rather 
than attempt to synthesize a chromosome which sustains wild-type growth rates, even if the 
sequence contains some small deviations from the original design which do not impede growth, 
they have attempted to precisely synthesize the specified sequence. Because bugs are defined in 
the project discourse as DNA sequences impairing growth rather than sequences deviating from 
the original specifications, bugs and debugging become less relevant to achieving “perfection.”  
 
“Refactoring”  
A second programming-derived expression, “refactoring,” appears in the design-focused article 
by Richardson and colleagues and in myriad conference and seminar presentations. According to 
the synthetic biologists who introduced the term to the field, refactoring aims to “improve the 
internal structure of an existing system for future use, while simultaneously maintaining external 
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system function” (Chan, Kosuri, and Endy, 2005). In a computer programming context, 
refactoring streamlines a program and makes it easier to manipulate without changing how the 
program works from a user perspective. In a synthetic biology context, refactoring similarly 
means maintaining the original “wild-type” behavior of an organism, changing genotype without 
changing phenotype, to simplify or rationalize the genome according to some logic of the 
biologist. Chan, Kosuri, and Endy (2005), in “refactoring bacteriophage T7,” explain that in 
“convert[ing] the genome of a natural biological system, bacteriophage T7, to a more structured 
design,” they were “inspired by the practice of 'refactoring,' a process that is typically used to 
improve the design of legacy computer software” (1). In the Sc2.0 project, refactoring work 
includes changing TAG stop codons to the equally functional TAA to make TAG available for 
encoding atypical amino acids, relocating tRNA genes from the sixteen native yeast 
chromosomes to a new “neochromosome” to increase the stability of the synthetic chromosomes, 
and eliminating suspected noncoding DNA to make the genome approximately eight percent 
shorter.  
 Refactoring does not imply that biologists perfectly understand DNA as a genetic 
programming language. Refactoring does, however, suggest that biologists see themselves as 
understanding that language fluently enough to be able to improve an existing program. 
Refactoring relies on and reinforces a theme common to the broader synthetic biology 
community: that biologists can improve nature, where the assessment criteria for judging 
improvement are held by the scientists. Synthetic biologists “improve” or “optimize” the 
functions of enzymes, pathways, and cells, small steps en route to larger goals of making 
biological systems more predictable and easier to engineer, themselves steps en route to 
harnessing biology to build a better future (“What’s in a Name?”, 2009). Refactoring participates 
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in this vision of biological systems as instrumental tools for serving an anthropocentric world.  
 Biological systems employed in laboratories have always been shaped to serve human 
needs, even when those human needs have been about understanding biological systems rather 
than about altering those systems to suit scientist-specified functions (Leonelli and Ankeny, 
2013). The new move signaled by “refactoring” in synthetic biology has to do with the increased 
degree of scientific control in scientists’ presumed ability to directly change and improve 
genomic DNA—that is, the system understood to directly control the operation of the organism. 
Beyond extending the implication of scientific mastery over the yeast genome, refactoring also 
extends the assumption that the yeast genome and other biological systems are materials that are 
better when they serve scientific interests and implies that scientists are the best arbiters of what 
the cell should need to function. Better, in this case, is a matter of making the genetic code easier 
for the scientist to understand and manipulate such that the primary user of the yeast genome is 
implied to be scientist rather than the yeast.  
 Looking at the array of metaphors previously documented in popular articles about 
synthetic biology, we can see that computer programming metaphors have become constitutive 
of the Sc2.0 project’s work while domestic metaphors of stitching and sewing or cutting and 
pasting (Hellsten and Nerlich, 2011) have disappeared. It has become essentially impossible to 
describe the Sc2.0 project without relying on programming metaphors, not least because Sc2.0 
itself is one of them. But by discussing Sc2.0 and not patchwork, collage, or piecemeal yeast, 
Sc2.0 becomes aligned with contemporary digital technologies and distanced from low-tech 
domestic labor.  
 Notably, while genomes are widely discussed as programmable, cells are not discussed as 
computers and, at least in this context, individual genes are not described as program functions. 
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This distinction will become important, as I address in the conclusion, in appreciating how 
metaphors mix, operate across biological scales, and shape what synthetic yeast becomes.  
 
CHROMOSOME IS A LANDSCAPE  
A second metaphor operating at the gene, chromosome, and genome level envisions that the 
CHROMOSOME IS A LANDSCAPE. loxPsym sites employed in the SCRaMbLE system are 
located at genomic “landmarks” (Mercy et al., 2017). Chromosomal regions with repetitive 
sequences are “nonmappable” when studying the 3D organization of genomes incorporating 
synthetic chromosomes (Mercy et al., 2017), while individual growth defects can be “mapped” to 
a “design feature” (Mitchell et al., 2017).  
 As with computer metaphors, landscape metaphors are prevalent in earlier synthetic 
biology discourse and preceding genomics discourses, with “genome mapping” the most obvious 
and widespread example. These metaphors made scientists behind the Human Genome Project 
and similar endeavors into pioneers, bravely exploring new territories, creating maps for the 
benefit of those who would follow, and pushing the scientific “frontier” (as Leah Ceccarelli has 
explored in detail in her 2013 book on the frontier metaphor). The resonance of landscape 
metaphors in Sc2.0, however, is slightly different. Rather than exploring new territory and 
creating new maps, construction workers on synthetic yeast are using maps as tools to work 
within the landscape they describe—they are inheritors of the metaphors which preceded them. 
Like a civil engineer, by having the map laid out before her, the Sc2.0 synthetic biologist is able 
to exercise control over the landscape and strategically operate upon it. Landscape metaphors, as 
with computer metaphors, reinforce the control scientists possess over the yeast genome. The 
kinds of control these two metaphors enable do not conflict, but contribute to how the yeast 
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genome is understood as a complex informational object: in addition to programming and 
debugging, reading and writing, scientists can locate and place “markers” within the genome. 
CHROMOSOME IS A PHYSICAL OBJECT 
Distinct from landscape metaphors, chromosomes are also conceptualized as physical objects 
and structures. Chromosomes are physical objects, inasmuch as any microscopic structure 
invisible to the human eye is imagined, invented, or brought into being as a part of the physical 
world through technologically mediated observation (Paxson and Helmreich, 2013). In the same 
sense, however, we might just as easily say that chromosomes are landscapes, or that DNA is a 
programming language. Read against other ways of conceptualizing chromosomes, the 
terminology of physical objects functions as another metaphor in activating a different 
conceptual schame for constructing what the chromosome is. 
Chromosomes are “captured” by scientific techniques used to understand how they 
interact. They are “tethered” and have “trajectories” within the nuclear space (Mercy et al., 
2017). Chromosomal “arms” are “capped” by telomeres, with regions that can be “cleaved” and 
“tagged” – expressions found across the whole corpus. Each chromosome is being constructed 
from “chunks,” subdivided into “minichunks” and attached to each other to form “megachunks,” 
any of which are sometimes more generally referred to as “building blocks” (Richardson et al., 
2017). Significantly, unit parts of chromosomes are never described as “bricks,” as the brick 
metaphor is conceptually associated with parts-based approaches to synthetic biology, the 
BioBrick standard for biological parts, and the nonprofit parts-sharing BioBricks Foundation and 
international Genetically Engineered Machine (iGEM) competition with which that standard is 
associated (Shetty et al. 2008), none of which are associated with the Sc2.0 project. “Brick,” in 
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synthetic biology discourse, invokes a set of assumptions and way of seeing which constructors 
of Sc2.0 do not want to bring to bear on their work.  
 Physical object schema reinforce the idea that biological systems are or can be made 
modular – a common guiding principle across synthetic biology (Kendig and Eckdahl, 2017). In 
combination with computer and landscape metaphors, they also reinforce that genetic sequences 
are complex objects with characteristics that can be understood as similar to multiple distinct 
source domains; chromosomes are simultaneously information-carrying and physical objects 
which can be viewed in relation to each other from a distance or picked up, moved around, 
subdivided or stuck together. Again, however, while chunks might be “introduced sequentially 
from left to right” (Richardson et al., 2017), “assembled” or “integrated” (Zhang et al., 2017), 
they are not “stitched” or “sewn.” Sc2.0 constructors depict themselves as high-tech 
programmers or engineers or builders of complex objects, but not as domestic laborers.  
 
A visual metaphor: Sc2.0 is a jigsaw puzzle  
Alongside the name Saccharomyces cerevisiae 2.0, the project is branded through a logo (figure 
1) depicting a brightly orange-fluorescing budding yeast cell on a black background as a jigsaw 
puzzle with two pieces yet to be placed to complete the picture. While the jigsaw puzzle 
metaphor does not appear in the texts of the special issue, this image coheres with expressions 
that make the cell the product of assembling modular parts.  
 
GENOME IS AN CUSTOM PRODUCT 
Both chromosomes and the genome are also depicted as authentic or “designer” products, 
expressions that can be related to two different relevant discourses with different resonances. 
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“Designer” is a derivative of “design” as used in the classic design-build-test cycle of 
engineering, widely co-opted by synthetic biologists to describe what they do (e.g. the “'design-
build-test-debug' working loop” described in Shen et al., 2017). “Designer chromosome” is a 
short step from “design a chromosome.” But “designer” and “to design” also activate 
substantially different resonances in general discourse, where “designer” is associated with 
fashion and other forms of high-culture consumption. “Designer genome” suggests that Sc2.0 is 
unique, desirable, and valuable as a rare or limited authentic product. In that sense, “designer 
genomes” appear to challenge the trajectory of synthetic biology that drives toward making 
whole organisms standardized platforms, commodifying cells as products which can be mass-
produced and widely used for routine purposes (Calvert, 2008). While component parts of the 
synthetic yeast genome may be standard modules, chunks, or building blocks, the results of 
assembling those parts are not presented as standardized, but as customized.  
 
Bridging biological scales and whole-organism metaphors  
As numerous metaphor studies have documented and theorized mixed metaphors (e.g. 
Ceccarelli, 2004; Condit, 1999; Kimmel, 2010), finding mixed metaphors in the literature of the 
Sc2.0 project is unsurprising. Perhaps more surprising, given the project’s position as a 
“vanguard” (Hilgartner, 2015) or aspirational forerunner of whole-genome engineering, is how 
little work these metaphors do independently or in concert to connect characteristics of the gene, 
chromosome, or genome with those of the whole organism. Most operate at the level of the 
chromosome, conceiving of the chromosome as a landscape which can be mapped or marked, a 
physical object which can be captured or constructed out of building blocks, or a computer 
program which can be debugged or refactored. Genes are located and relocated on chromosomes. 
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Chromosomes are modules of the genome in the sense that debugging each chromosome 
contributes to debugging the genome, though it is unclear whether the whole genome will still 
have bugs even if all individual chromosomes are bug-free. But these metaphors do not extend to 
say anything about how the chromosomal landscape relates to the whole organism containing it – 
or enveloping it? or housing it? – or how reprogramming the cellular operating system relates to 
changing the cell which operates it.   
 Two exceptions stand out. Refactoring, understood as changing genotype without altering 
phenotype, creates a relationship between the thing being refactored – either the genome or any 
given chromosome – and its “output,” that is, the whole cell’s behavior which, per the 
refactoring metaphor, remains the same despite changes to the program. In addition, three papers 
(Mitchell et al., 2017; Shen et al., 2017; Xie et al., 2017) observe that synthetic chromosomes 
“power” or “are capable of powering” yeast cell growth, making the cell a machine or computer 
and the genome its engine. Yet, these metaphors are never employed at the cell or whole-
organism level; the yeast cell or Saccharomyces cerevisiae is never described as a computer or a 
machine. Indeed, the whole organism is analogized only in the project’s logo (figure 1), which 
might be read as emphasizing the modularity of the cell as a metonym for the much less 
recognizably depicted genome.  
 Together, the mixed or nested metaphors applied at the chromosome or genome level and 
the relative lack of whole-organism metaphors make space for the whole synthetic organism to 
have emergent properties not necessarily predicted by the characteristics of its parts. The cell is 
conspicuously not invoked as merely the higher structural level of its components. On the 
contrary, that a mixture of metaphors is useful for genomes, chromosomes, and genes suggests 
that it might become appropriate to bring in a new metaphor to describe the properties of a whole 
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organism with a synthetic genome. The implication is that the properties of that organism are not 
necessarily simply constrained by the properties of the synthetic genome. By leaving this space – 
which could have been filled by constitutive metaphors applied to the whole cell, but is not – as 
well as through descriptions of “designer” genomes or chromosomes, the Sc2.0 literature does 
not discursively construct the synthetic yeast cell as a standardized module as might be expected. 
Instead, it implies that while the whole cell can be anticipated to emerge from the assembly of its 
chromosomes, that cell will be a unique construction with features which may not yet be 
completely understood.  
Discussion 
Metaphors as arguments for engineering whole organisms  
In 2000, American systems biologist Bernhard Palsson forecast that future synthetic biologists 
would “move from talking about genetic engineering of single genes, to what may become 
known as ‘genome engineering,’ where the whole organism is the context of the design” 
(Palsson, 2000). The Sc2.0 project might be easily be seen as a step in that direction. On the 
basis of this analysis, however, Sc2.0 seems to present a path to engineering whole organisms 
that does not involve designing the whole organism at all. Instead, component parts of the 
organism are designed with the implication that the whole will emerge from the aggregation of 
its components. Like the suggestion made by its jigsaw puzzle logo, assembling the 
chromosomes which constitute the primary unit of operation for Sc2.0 will presumably cause the 
complete image of the whole synthetic yeast to appear. Chromosomes, and perhaps even the 
whole genome itself, serve as metonyms for the whole organism—that is, parts which stand in 
for difficult-to-grasp wholes to “convey some incorporeal or intangible state in terms of the 
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corporeal or tangible” (Burke, 1945, 506). The metonym allows programming the whole 
organism, as an abstract ‘living thing,’ to become the more easily grasped problem of 
programming the chromosome so that grappling with engineering ‘life’ can be elided or deferred.  
 Yet, the characteristics of the whole may exceed the sum of the characteristics of the 
parts. The characteristics of the whole are not pre-structured by metaphors applied to the parts. 
The whole may therefore be surprising when it is seen, in the same sense that Ankeny and 
Leonelli (2011) and others point out that model organisms are useful in part because they are 
able to “surprise” researchers when the complexity of the organism exceeds the complexity 
captured in the scientist’s understanding of the model. The whole organism will become an 
“epistemic thing” in Rheinberger's (2005) sense of a material scientific object which is 
“inherently polysemous” and therefore epistemically generative, a “motor of knowledge 
acquisition” precisely because continuing to investigate it can reveal previously unseen things. 
This space for surprise, together with metaphorical expressions about “designer” genomes, 
appears to challenge the idea that synthetic biology is necessarily extending modularity and 
standardization to the whole-organism level. At its current state of progress, Sc2.0 does not seem 
to advance a vision of engineered organisms as standardized components so much as engineered 
organisms as designer objects.  
 
Metaphors and constructing life  
Scientific metaphors are tools for enacting future worlds and should enter into conversations 
about what new worlds are desirable to create. Studying metaphors that shape synthetic biology 
is important for understanding how synthetic yeast and its potential future synthetic kin are being 
made, providing entry points for discussing how such organisms might, could, or should be 
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made. Conversations about the ramifications of communication in synthetic biology thus need to 
include how metaphors are employed in disciplinary scientific discourse. How scientific 
metaphors are mobilized in broader public discourse and scientific popularizations becomes an 
additional set of considerations. This same argument can be applied to science and scientific 
discourse in general. What makes synthetic biology worthy of special consideration are the tools 
synthetic biologists have at their disposal for making things through the images of their 
metaphors.  
 Conventional (understanding-focused) biology patterns its objects of study through its 
metaphors by making knowledge that reinforces particular terministic screens and, therefore, 
selective descriptions of what biological systems are understood to ‘really’ be. Because those 
descriptions are then used to construct or choose tools for further research, including cells, in 
iterative cycles of making things to make knowledge to make things, metaphors alter physical 
biological systems as well as knowledge about them. In synthetic biology, fewer intermediaries 
are involved because the scientific goal is itself to alter the physical biological system, not (or at 
least in addition) to describe it. Consequently, synthetic biologists are able to implement their 
conceptual understandings about biological systems more quickly, more directly, and in ways 
shaped by different physical tools. And, importantly, synthetic biologists are applying those tools 
at the level of genomes – that is, at the level to which current paradigms ascribe the most direct 
control over the operation of whole cells and whole organisms.   
 By making yeast something which can be debugged and refactored, the synthetic yeast 
project is changing the possibilities for human-yeast relationships. Through discourse that treats 
DNA sequences as code, geneticists have made it possible to decode, encode, and recode genes. 
Through discourse that treats cells as computers, synthetic biologists make cells increasingly like 
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computers and move toward a future in which cells can be programmed, loaded with 
applications, and used to make products and solve problems. Through discourse that treats 
scientists as programmers of DNA, synthetic biology positions humans ever-increasingly as 
controllers of and masters over biological systems. Synthetic biology is thus primed to 
reinvigorate and strengthen narratives of humans as masters who can and should dominate over 
other species, in contrast to much of the environmentally minded rhetoric of the late twentieth 
century.  
  These discursive tools for making incrementally new worlds could, so the mantra of 
science and technology studies goes, always be otherwise. They are contingent, not inevitable. 
Consequently, it is both possible and necessary to consciously consider how what we want living 
things to be and what kinds of relationships we want to have with them – to ask the questions 
Bellacasa, Mol, Tsing, and others ask about “the effects of our accounts on the composition of 
things” (Bellacasa, 2011).  
 The Sc2.0 project is positioned to be an important forward step in synthetic biology's 
development. As the first eukaryotic genome synthesis project, it invokes the possibility of 
further eukaryotic genome synthesis projects. Choices made in the Sc2.0 project can be expected 
to influence the structure of those future projects. The vision espoused by Sc2.0 about how to 
make organisms engineerable may therefore have major ramifications for the evolution of the 
field and, perhaps, for the evolution of synthetic life.  
 
Limitations and conclusion 
An important limitation of this study is that I can draw no comparisons with similar analyses of 
metaphors in the peer-reviewed literature of other synthetic biology projects. While a number of 
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publications have examined metaphors in popular media accounts of synthetic biology, little 
work appears to have dealt with the peer-reviewed literature. Remedying this deficit would be 
useful to scholarship in rhetoric of science, science and technology studies, and science 
communication. Such studies would, furthermore, help scholars in these communities identify 
and spend more time in their common ground. Following the discursive practices of scientists 
through scientific publications – the most tangible and well-travelled instantiations of scientific 
discourse – is a useful complement to following the physical practices of scientists in their 
laboratories, where the interior workings of scientific texts are more difficult to see. Rhetorical 
microprocesses inside these texts constitute a primary means by which scientists constitute, 
codify, and share new knowledge. Amongst these, metaphors are central to how scientists create 
shared understandings of new things, of how they indicate what is indeed seen to be new, and of 
how they position themselves amongst other scientists. All of these need to be ongoing questions 
of interest in how synthetic biology and other technosciences take and make shape. 
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i in silico refers to symbolically designing, in a digital computer system, something which could 
be physically realized as a biological system. in yeasto refers to physically realizing something in 
live yeast. Both riff on terminology common in biology of performing experiments in vitro and 
in vivo. 
 
ii Stop codons signal to ribosomes that the ribosome has reached the end of the portion of a 
messenger RNA transcript that should be translated into a protein. 
 
iii Non-essential genes are genes which can be deleted or inactivated without killing the cell. 
They are putative because they have been identified as non-essential through previous 
experiments inactivating one or two genes at a time, but this set may not perfectly overlap with 
the set identified when multiple genes are inactivated simultaneously.  
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Table 1. Peer-reviewed articles about Saccharomyces cerevisiae 2.0 in Science (2017), vol. 355, 
issue 6329. 
Figure 1. The Sc2.0 logo.  
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Tables and figures  
 
Table 1.  
Article title Focus* First and last author 
3D organization of synthetic and scrambled 
chromosomes 
3D genome 
organization 
Mercy, G.,… Koszul, R. 
“Perfect” designer chromosome V and behavior of 
a ring derivative 
synV Xie, Z.-X.,… Yuan, Y.-J.  
Bug mapping and fitness testing of chemically 
synthesized chromosome X 
synX Wu, Y.,…Yuan, Y.-J. 
Deep functional analysis of synII, a 770-kilobase 
synthetic yeast chromosome 
synII Shen, Y.,…Yang, H.  
Synthesis, debugging, and effects of synthetic 
chromosome consolidation: synVI and beyond 
synVI Mitchell, L.A.,… Boeke, J.D. 
Engineering the ribosomal DNA in a megabase 
synthetic chromosome 
synXII Zhang, W.,… Dai, J.  
Design of a synthetic yeast genome Global design Richardson, S.M.,… Bader, J.S.  
*Across the yeast genetics community, chromosomes are typically numbered in order of size and 
referenced as chrI, chrII, etc. Standard nomenclature across the synthetic yeast project refers to 
the redesigned cognate chromosomes as synI, synII, etc.  
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Figure 1. 
